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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
GOLDEN SPIKE EQUIPMENT CO., 
A Utah Corporation 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
vs. 
HOWARD F. CROSHAW, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
No. 10266 
RESPONDENT'S ANSWERING BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This case commenced as an action for the balance 
due on a Conditional Sales Contract, payable in two in-
stallments, one of which was past due at the time the 
action was filed and the second of which was accelerated 
by Plaintiff-Respondent. Defendant-Appellant sought dis-
missal of the entire Complaint by a Motion for Summary 
Judgment, the denial of which is the question concerned 
with this appeal. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower Court granted Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, in part, in that it dismissed Plain-
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tiffs Complaint as to the second installment, and denied 
the Motion,- in part, in that it declined to dismiss Plain-
tiffs Complaint as to the first installment which was past 
due at the time Plaintiff's Complaint was filed. 
Trial of the case on its merits was held before a jury 
us to the past-due installment only. The jury returned 
a verdict in favor of the Plaintiff and the Court entered 
judgment in favor of the Plaintiff in the amount of $941.54, 
plus interest at 10 percent from November 1, 1963, and 
for $1.55.24 attorney's fees and costs. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment 
and a judgment granting Defendant's Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment dismissing Plaintiffs Complaint. 
Plaintiff seeks affirmance of the lower Court's denial 
of Defendant-Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
as to the FIRST installment, and affirmance of the jury 
verdict in favor of Plaintiff and of the judgment entered 
by the lower Court pursuant to the verdict of the jury. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff-Respondent will be referred to in this brief 
as Respondent and Defendant-Appellant will be referred 
to as Appellant. 
Golden Spike Equipment Company sold to Appellant 
a used, 1957 Combine on July 30, 1963, the parties execut-
ing a Conditional Sales Contract which provided for a 
cash price of $2.500, a time price differential of $124.61, 
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a credit of $700 as the down payment, and that the bal-
ance of $1,924.61 be paid in two installments, the first 
installment of $941.61 to be paid November 1, 1963, and 
the balance of $983.07 to be paid November 1, 1964, with 
acceleration, at the election of the Seller of any unpaid 
belance or other sums due, should the Buyer default on 
the contract. Appellant refused to pay the installment 
due November 1, 1963, and indicated he would not pay 
anything further on the contract. Without prior knowledge 
of Respondent, Appellant returned the combine to Respon-
dent's yard. 
Respondent and Appellant made several attempts to 
arrive at a compromise settlement of the balance due, all 
of which efforts failed. As a consequence, on May 20, 
1964, Respondent filed a Complaint accelerating the pay-
ment not yet due, and demanding payment of the entire 
balance of the contract in the amount of $1,924.61, to-
gether with interest, attorney's fees and costs. 
Appellant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment to 
dismiss Plaintiff's complaint on the grounds the Con-
tract was not enforceable under Section 15-'l-2a of the 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. The Court 
denied Defendant's Motion insofar as it pertained to the 
installment which was past due at the time of the filing 
of the Complaint. The minute entry in the records of the 
Clerk of the District Court of Box Elder County reads as 
follows: 
"The Motion for Summary Judgment having been sub-
mitted, and this being the time for decision on said 
motion, at this time the Court declines to dismiss this 
action on summary judgment. However, the motion 
as to the second installment on the contract is granted, 
but as-to the first installment, the motion is denied." 
The case was tried before a jury on the past due 
installment only, at which trial Respondent was granted 
judgment as prayed for, without prejudice to file a Com-
plaint on the second and last installment as the same 
became past due. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING 
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDG-
MENT TO DISMISS RESPONDENT'S COM-
PLAINT AS TO THE PAST DUE INSTALLMENT. 
The filing of a Complaint declaring the entire amount 
of a Conditional Sales Contract due and payable does not 
violate a Buyer's right under Section 15-1-2a B ( 4) of the 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, to pay the full 
indebtedness of a contract any time prior to final maturity. 
Respondent has also been unable to find a statute 
similar to Section 15-l-2a of the Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, and has also been unable to find any cases from 
other jurisdictions that are directly in point. 
Appellant argues that the language of the statute is 
clear and proposes two actions a seller can take to violate 
the provision of subdivision ( 4) and suffer the penalty 
set forth in subdivision ( 5). One is by refusing to accept 
an advance payment by the buyer and the other is to 
demand the entire unpaid balance before maturity. 
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However, quoting from subdivision ( 4), the statute 
reads: 
"Any provision in any conditional sale contract 
for the sale of personal property to the contrary not-
withstanding, the buyer may satisfy in full the indebt-
edness evidenced by such contract at any time before 
the final maturity thereof, and in so satisfying such 
indebtedness shall receive a refund credit thereon for 
such anticipation of payments." 
The remainder of the section is concerned with the 
amount of interest refund to which a buyer would be en-
titled in the event of advance payment of a contract. 
It should be particularly noted that in the same sen-
tence in which the statute provides that a buyer may 
satisfy in full the indebtedness evidenced by a contract 
at any time prior to the final maturity thereof, the Legis-
lature provides that the buyer, in so paying the indebted-
ness before the final maturity of the contract, is entitled 
to a certain refund of interest on the anticipated pay-
ments. It should also be particularly noted that the 
statute makes no reference whatsoever to the acceleration 
of payments in a contract. Respondent therefore submits 
that Appellant is misinterpreting the intent of subdivision 
( 4) and that neither of the two courses of action of a 
seller which he sets forth would invoke the penalty of 
subdivision ( 5). It is neither the refusal of a seller to 
accept advance payments nor the acceleration of pay-
ments which the legislature intended to penalize (sub-
division 5), but the failure of the seller to give a "refund 
credit thereon for such anticipation of payments." 
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Appellant quotes from In Re Steven's Estate, 107 
Utah 255 at 259, 130 Pac. 2nd 85, where the Court said: 
"The language of the statute is plain and its meaning is 
dear, in which case there is no occasion to search for its 
meaning beyond the statute itself." However, Appellant 
is searching in this case far beyond the wording of Section 
15-l-2a for an interpretation and an effect that is not so 
much as hinted at, even though the language of Section 
15-l-2a is "plain and its meaning clear." 
POINT 2. 
THE SUPREME COURT OF UT AH HAS, SINCE 
THE ENACTMENT OF SECTION 15-l-2a, UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDED, SPE-
CIFICALLY RECOGNIZED THE RIGHT OF A 
SELLER TO ACCELERATE PAYMENTS IN A 
CONTRACT WHEN THE BUYER IS IN DE-
FAULT. 
In the case of Soter vs. Snyder, decided by the Su-
preme Court of Utah on December 9, 1954, the respon-
dent, Zeke Snyder, counterclaimed against appellant for 
the entire amount due on a conditional sales agreement, 
appellants having breached same by failing to make two 
monthly payments due thereon and respondent Zeke 
Snyder under the terms of said agreement having elected 
to declare the entire sum due and owing. 
The Supreme Court of Utah affirmed the judgment 
of the lower court for the respondent on his counterclaim. 
Appellants argued that the court erred in granting 
judgment on the counterclaim and further erred in pro-
viding in the judgment that Snyder retain title to the per-
sonal property until the judgment was paid in full. Quot-
ing from the case: 
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"Appellants contend that such judgment was con-
trary to the law and the agreement of the parties be-
cause by providing that the seller may at his option 
declare the entire sum due and owing upon the pur-
chasers defaulting in any of the payments when due 
or within 30 days thereafter, and upon such failure of 
the purchasers, the sellers could retake possession of 
said property and could retain any payments as liqui-
dated damages, respondent thereby expressly agreed 
that his only remedy for breach of this contract should 
be repossession." 
The Supreme Court replied: 
"We cannot agree with this argument. 
Further quoting: 
"Did the court err in providing in the judgment 
that respondent Zeke Snyder retain his title in the pro-
pe1ty until the judgment was fully paid and satisfied? 
... We are of the opinion that the court did not err in 
granting such a judgment and that such a judgment 
merely enforces the terms of the contract into which 
the p~rties voluntarily entered." 
John Soter and Tom Soter, Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. Zeke Snvder and Strevell-Paterson Finance Co .. 
a Corporatidn, Defendants and Respondents, 277 Pac. 
2nd 966 ( 3 Utah 2nd 28). 
POINT 3. 
THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT IN SUBDIVISION 
( 4) MUST BE DETERMINED BY REVIEW OF 
THE STATUTE AS A WHOLE. 
Quoting from Sutherland Statutory Construction, 
Volume 2, 3rd Edition, Chapter 47: 
"A statute is passed as a whole and not in parts 
or sections and is animated by one general purpose 
and intent. Consequently, each part or section 
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should be construed in connection with every other 
part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole. 
Thus it is not proper to confine interpretation to the 
one section to be construed." 
Section 4703, Page 336. 
Further quoting from Sutherland Statutory Con-
struction: 
"The literal interpretation of the words of an act 
should not prevail if it creates a result contrary to 
the apparent intention of the legislature and if the 
words are sufficiently flexible to admit of a construc-
tion which will effectuate the legislative intention. 
The intention prevails over the letter, and the letter 
must if possible, be read so as to conform to the spirit 
of the act "while the intention of the legislature must 
be ascertained from the words used to express it, the 
manifest reason and obvious purpose of the law should 
not be sacrificed to a literal interpretation of such 
words." Thus words or clauses may be enlarged or 
restricted to harmonize with other provisions of an 
act. The particular inquiry is not what is the abstract 
force of the words or what they may comprehend, but 
in what sense were they intended to be used in the 
act. The sense in which they were used by the legis-
lature furnishes the rules of interpretation and when 
this cannot be determined from the context of the 
act, the court may resort to extrinsic aids. Obviously, 
if the words of the act indicate the legislative intent 
other sources may not be resorted to to establish a 
meaning contrary to that intention." 
Section 4706, page 339 
Appellant argues for an interpretation of subdivision 
( 4), which involves not just an isolated section or sentence 
even, but a portion of one sentence. Appellant has lifted 
from its context the first part of the first sentence of sub-
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division ( 4), which states that a buyer "may satisfy in 
full the indebtedness of a contract at any time before the 
final maturity thereon" and ignored the second part of 
the sentence which guarantees to the buyer a refund 
credit. A reading of the complete sentence shows that 
the legislature intended to assure a buyer that, in satisfy-
ing in advance an indebtedness on a contract, the buyer 
is to receive a refund credit for such anticipation of pay-
ments. This refund credit would have to be given the 
buyer whether he voluntarily paid the contract in advance 
of the installments agreed to be paid, or was required to 
pay in advance because of an acceleration provision in 
event of default. 
POINT 4. 
THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT IN SUBDIVISION 
(4) IS DIRECTORY ONLY, AND THEN AS TO 
THE BUYER RATHER THAN THE SELLER. 
All that Section 15-l-2a B ( 4), Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended, requires is that the buyer "may satisfy" 
(emphasis added) his indebtedness on a contract before 
the final maturity date. The statute does not require that 
the seller "must" provide the buyer with the opportunity 
to pay before the final scheduled contract payment re-
gardless of statements and actions by the buyer which 
clearly indicate his intention not to pay. 
Quoting from Sutherland Statutory Constmction, 3rd 
Edition, Volume 2, Chapter 28: 
"The important distinction between directory 
and mandatory statutes is that the violation of the 
former is attended with no consequence, while the 
failure to comply with the requirements of the latter 
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either invalidates purported transactions or subjects 
the_ noncomplier to affirmative legal liabilities."-
'This distinction grows out of the fundamental 
difference in the intention of the legislature in enact-
ing the two statutes. Although directory provisions 
are not intended by the legislature to be disregarded, 
yet the seriousness of noncompliance is not consid-
ered so great that liability automatically attaches for 
failure to comply. The question of compliance re-
mains for judicial determination. If the legislature 
considers the provisions sufficiently important that 
exact compliance is required then the provision is 
mandatory." 
Section 2801, Page 214. 
Thus, the legislature, in using the word "may," in 
Section l.5-1-2a B ( 4) has provided the buyer with an op-
portunity, should he so desire, to satisfy a contractual 
indebtedness in full prior to the final maturity thereon, 
hut has not placed upon the seller a mandatory obligation 
to hold open the contract until a certain final scheduled 
payment date, nor has the legislature by any mandatory 
language or implied language invalidated other terms of 
the same contract which provide for acceleration of pay-
ments. 
Therefore, in the present case, where the buyer has 
indicated, by clear action and positive statements, that he 
lias no intention of exercising the opportunity afforded 
him by the statute to make advance payment of his con-
tract and is in fact in default therein, and because the 
statute is not mandatory in its language, either that the 
~eller provide the buyer with or that the buyer has the 
opportunity to advance pay his contract, up until a certain 
10 
date, regardless of the buyer's express intention or default 
on the contract, all Appellant's rights have been af-
forded him and, by proper interpretation of the statute 
in question, Respondent cannot claim the seller should 
be denied the right to collect payment of his contract. 
POINT 5. 
IT WOULD BE AN "ABSURD" AND "UNCONS-
CIONABLE" INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 
15-l-2a, B(4) and (5), TO HOLD THAT MERELY 
BY INVOKING A CONTRACTURAL PROVISION 
FOR ACCELERATION, A SELLER SHOULD BE 
DENIED THE RIGHT TO ENFORCE HIS CON-
TRACT. 
Respondent submits two points which should here 
be considered. 
First, Appellant sought relief in the District Court 
from the effect of an accelerated payment in a contract 
into which Appellant had freely and voluntarily entered 
and was granted such relief. The Complaint of the Re-
spondent was dismissed as to the payment which had 
been accelerated and trial was had before a jury upon the 
merits of the past due payment only. The full protection 
of the law, including any possible protection due Appe1lant 
under Section 15-l-2a, was therefore fully accorded Ap-
pellant. However, Appellant, after losing his case before 
the jury, now claims that even though the trial court did 
not permit acceleration of the remaining payment, the 
Respondent is not entitled to collect, even on a past due 
payment, because of the fact it attempted to invoke accel-
eration; that the Seller must be further penalized and its 
entire contract declared unenforceable. This appears to 
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Respondent to be not only an "absurd" interpretation of 
the Statute in question, but an unconscionable one as well. 
Second, Respondent contends that a reasonable inter-
pretation of subdivision ( 4) is that the Legislature in-
tended what the Statute says; that is, to guarantee to a 
buyer the right to a refund credit in the event of advance 
payment of his contract. This is a most equitable guaran-
tee and one that has been protected by case law in other 
jurisdictions. 
For example, in the case of Northtown Theater Cor-
poration, Appellants, vs. J. J. Mickelson, Trustee of the 
Estate of Mill Citv Plastics, Inc., and Mill Citv Plastics _, , 
Industries, Inc., its successor, Bankrupt, Appellee, which 
was decided in the United States Court of Appeals, Eighth 
Circuit, October 21, 1955, the Court or Appeals held that 
a mortgagee could not collect interest beyond the day 
to which the principal debt was accelerated. 
This was an action involving a claim for interest by 
a mortgagee against a bankrupt estate. The Referee in 
Bankruptcy disallowed the claim for interest and the 
mortgagee appealed. The Court of Appeals held that 
"where chattel mortgage secured not only payment of 
principal debt but also payment of interest, filing of bank-
ruptcy proceedings by debtor did not entitle mortgagee 
to invoke acceleration clause so as to collect unearned 
interest, and mortgagee was entitled only to interest up to 
date of payment of principal debt," 
Further quoting from the decision of the Appellate 
Court at page 214: 
"It was the contention of the Appellant before 
the Referee in Bankruptcy and before the trial court 
that it was entitled to interest up to the date when 
the indebtedness became payable instead of limiting 
the interest to the date of payment of the debt. . . 
The trial court was of the view that the acceleration 
clauses in the circumstances disclosed bv the record 
created a penalty and hence were unenf~rceable and 
that having invoked the acceleration clause as the 
basis for its claim to unearned interest it was not 
entitled to recover. The only question in this case 
is whether or not the Court erred in limiting the right 
to collect interest to the date of payment rather than 
extending it to the date when the indebtedness be-
came due and payable according to the written agree-
ment of the parties." 
" .... the trial court in its decision in this phase 
of the case, among other things, said: 
" ... in cases like the present, where the mort-
gage is given to secure a fixed sum representing the 
aggregate of principal and the intrest thereon for a 
period of the mortgage, the rule is that a clause ac-
celerating the maturity of the debt will not be en-
forced except upon cancellation of the unearned 
interest, for to do so would be unconscionable." 
" ... lri other words, if under the circumstances here 
disclosed Appellant could not, by invoking the acel-
era tion clause in his mortgage, have collected the 
unearned interest from the debtor he could not 
exact payment for such unearned interest from the 
bankrupt's estate." 
( 226 Federal 2nd 212) 
No claim has ever been made by Appellant that Re-
spondent attempted to collect interest to the date when 
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the indebtedness became payable, but rather the record 
clearly shows that upon acceleration, Respondent sought 
recovery of the principal debt with interest thereon only 
to the date it had declared the entire principal balance 
due and payable. 
In summary ( 1) Appellant was granted relief by 
the trial Court, from an accelerated payment, and ( 2) 
Respondent did not make any attempt whatsoever to col-
lect interest from Appellant beyond the accelerated pay-
ment date. To now hold that subdivision ( 5) requires 
that Respondent be further penalized and denied the 
right to enforce its contract because of its mere act of 
trying to proceed under a contractual provision for accel-
eration would, Respondent submits, be a truly "absurd" 
and "unconscionable" interpretation of Section 15-l-2a. 
POINT 6. 
THE FINAL MATURITY DATE OF A CONTRACT 
MAY BE EITHER THE DATE UPON WHICH THE 
FINAL PAYMENT IS SCHEDULED TO BE PAID, 
OR THE DATE TO WHICH PAYMENT HAS 
BEEN PROPERLY ACCELERATED BY THE 
SELLER UPON DEFAULT OF THE BUYER. 
The entire premise upon which Appellant seems to 
base his case is that the legislature intended the final 
maturity date of any and every contract to be the date 
of the final regular payment, regardless of the terms of 
the contract, and regardless of whether or not all pay-
ments are made as agreed. In laboring this point, Ap-
pellant overlooks the right of parties to voluntarily agree 
upon such terms as they may desire. Further, the Su-
-
preme Court of Utah has recognized the validity of con-
tract provisions for the acceleration of payments in the 
event the buyer defaults. Respondent therefore submits 
that when a buyer and seller have contracted for the 
<'.cceleration of payments upon the default of the buyer, 
the final maturity date of the contract is then no longer 
the date the last payment could be made if all prior pay-
ments were regularly made, but the final maturity date of 
the contract becomes that date upon which the seller has, 
in accordance with the terms of the contract between the 
parties, delcared the unpaid balance to be due and pay-
able. 
Under this recognition of the meaning of "final ma-
turity date," it is not necessary to strain a part of a sen-
tence in Section 15-l-2a B( 4) in such a way as to make 
invalid all acceleration clauses in all contracts made in 
Utah. Further, a buyer is protected by the statute in his 
right to pay the unpaid balance of his contractural obli-
gation in full prior to the final maturity date, and receive 
full, correct interest refund credit, whether that maturity 
date is the date the final scheduled payment becomes due 
or the date to which final maturity is properly accelerated 
by the seller upon the default of the buyer. 
Since the Appellant in the present case had been 
fully protected through the entire period of the contract 
in his right to pay the balance off, had negotiated at length 
with the seller, and had, in fact, conveved to the seller 
his refusal to make payment of his indebtedness, and was 
in default on the payment of the first installment, the 
seller was under no obligation, either statutory, moral or 
legal, to do a useless act and leave open the payment date 
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of the contract. On the contrary, the seller properly pro-
ceeded to Jake the only reasonable course of action to 
bring the disagreement to a conclusion, and that was to 
invoke acceleration, and declare the entire unpaid balance 
due and payable, thereby advancing the final maturity 
date to that agreed upon by the buyer in the event of his 
default, which unpaid balance included principal, at-
torney's fees and interest to the advanced maturity date, 
and to file legal action to recover the balance. 
It should again be noted here that Respondent did 
not seek interest on its contract to the final payment date 
stated in the cantract had the payments been made on 
the contract as agreed, but sought intrest only to and 
including the day the entire balance was declared due 
and unpaid. Respondent, in seeking interest only to the 
advanced maturity date of the contract, thereby gave to 
the Appellant, in effect, a refund credit on the interest 
Appellant had agreed to pay (the time price differential), 
thus fully recognizing and protecting the Appellant in his 
statutory right to receive a refund credit in the event of 
advance payment of the contract. It is immaterial that 
the Appellant became entitled to a credit on interest be-
cause the advance maturity date of payment was brought 
about by his own default on the contract. 
POINT 7. 
APPELLANT HAS MADE PAYMENT OF THE 
CONTRACT BALANCE AND THIS APPEAL IS 
THEREFORE NOT PROPER. 
Shortly after the jury returned its verdict and judg-
ment was rendered by the Court, the Appellant paid to 
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Respondent not only paid the full amount of the judgment, 
but the full amount of the contract as well. Having done 
so, he indicated his intention to abide by the judgment. 
There is an annotation in 39 A. L. R. 2nd, commenc-
ing at page 1.53, which treats this subject. There is a con-
siderable conflict of opinion as to whether or not a judg-
ment, once paid, can be appealed. 
Page 158 of the annotation sets forth a reasonable 
standard by which to resolve the question, and we quote: 
"In view of the conflicting results reached by 
the courts under the test of voluntariness of payment 
or performance of a judgment, it is submitted that 
the test is not satisfactory. 
"It is submitted that the proper test is whether 
payment or performance of a judgment takes place 
under circumstances which show an intention on the 
part of the defeated party to abide by the judgment." 
Execution had not been issued or served upon the 
Appellant at the time he made payment to the Respon-
dent, nor had any demands for the payment of the judg-
ment been made upon him, nor had any threats of execu-
tion been made him, either written or oral. No coersion 
of any kind had been exercised for the purpose of forcing 
or even encouraging Appellant to make payment of the 
judgment. 
Further, Appellant did not pay the money into Court, 
subject to the hearing of an appeal, nor did he indicate 
any conditions to Respondent upon payment of the money 
to Respondent, such as its return in the event of a success-
ful appeal. He in fact paid off the entire contract. 
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It should therefore be concluded that payment of the 
judgment by Appellant took place under circumstances 
which show an intention on his part to abide by the judg-
ment. Respondent submits that under these circum-
stances the appeal should be dismissed. 
Respondent, in summary, submits that, since Appellant 
was fully protected in his rights in the lower court in that 
a careful and cautions trial judge did not permit acceler-
ation of an installment not yet due and partially granted 
Appellant's Motion for Summary judgment, and since there 
has been no claim whatsoever that Respondent failed to 
credit Appellant with a refund on his interest to the date 
the entire balance of the contract was declared due and 
payable, it would not be an equitable or justifiable inter-
pretation of Section 15-l-2a, to penalize Respondent to 
the extent of declaring its entire contract unenforceable. 
~ The Statute does not purport to outlaw or rewrite 
the right of parties to contract for any given due date, 
including an advanced or accelerated due date for default, 
impairment of security, insolvency or other reason. Sec-
tion 15-l-2a is found under the "Interest" chapter and by 
title has to do with maximum rates. Subsection B ( 4) 
gives to a buyer a right to satisfy an obligation at any 
time before final maturity and in so satisfying to receive a 
refund credit. Appellant was not deprived of that right 
here. In fact, the lower Court could have protected his 
right by submitting to the jury not only the questions con-
cerning the past due installment, but the amount of the 
second installment as well, less the mandatory refund 
credit. However, the Court bent over backwards to af-
ford Appellant all possible rights hy dismissing without 
prejudice Respondent's accelerated claim for the second 
payment clue in November of 1964. 
CONCLUSION 
An examination of the balance of subdivision B ( 4) 
makes it clear that the right of a buyer established thereby 
is to prepay and receive a refund credit for such prepay-
ment. Everything that follows the first part of the first 
sentence has to do with the amount and computation of 
the refund. Sudivision B ( 5) likewise refers to errors of 
computation. 
The evidence, the law and proper interpretation of 
Section l.5-l-2a B ( 4) and ( 5) of the Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, as amended, show that Respondent did not in 
any way violate the right of the buyer to satisfy in full 
the indebtedness he owed to the Respondent under the 
terms of the conditional sale contract, and the penalty 
provided in subdivision ( .5) should therefore not be in-
voked. 
The appeal should further be dismissed because of 
payment in full of the judgment by Appellant under such 
circumstances as to indicate that he fully intended to be 
hound by the judgment. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Sherma Hansen 
Omer J. Call 
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